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I. INTRODUCTION
What do black women, Latino gay men and transgender bisexuals all have in
common? These minority subclasses,1 along with many others, are protected by
current employment discrimination laws to a limited extent. Discrimination
against individuals who belong to multiple minority groups is known as
intersectional discrimination.2 Intersectional discrimination is often overlooked in
antidiscrimination law, despite the increasing prevalence of this form of
discrimination.3 The absence of intersectionality as a consideration in employment
discrimination statutes specifically, and from civil rights discourse more broadly,
is known as intersectional invisibility.4
A current shortcoming of employment discrimination jurisprudence from a
remedial perspective is that courts are generally unresponsive to claims made by
discrete minority subclasses.5 Rather, most courts effectively require that distinct
minority subclasses frame employment discrimination claims as a member of one
protected class or another, but not as a member of two or more protected groups.
For reasons that will be explained below, a black woman, for example, is
essentially required to frame a discrimination claim as a racial minority or as a
gender minority, but not through a combination in many jurisdictions. As a result,
individuals who are members of multiple protected classes often lack a complete
remedy in the employment discrimination context. In effect, this is judicially
propagated intersectional invisibility.

1. For purposes of this paper, a “minority subclass” refers to a group that is composed of two or
more minorities. Thus, Black women, who are both racial and gender minorities, Latino homosexuals,
who are both racial and sexual orientation minorities, and bisexual transgender people, who are both
gender identity and sexual orientation minorities, all constitute minority subclasses. There are
innumerable minority subclasses, particularly when considering a broad range of minority categories
such as age, disability, religion, national origin, etc.
2. According to the EEOC, intersectional discrimination “occurs when someone is discriminated
against because of the combination of two or more protected bases (e.g. national origin and race).”
EEOC, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on National Origin Discrimination, Notice 915.005 (Nov. 18,
2016), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/national-origin-guidance.cfm#_Toc451518804.
More generally, “[i]ntersectionality theory posits that individuals have multiple identities that are not
addressed by legal doctrines based solely on a single identity or status.” DIANNE AVERY, ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 47 (8th
ed. 2010).
3. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance
Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS 811, 813–14 (2013) (discussing
the concept of intersectional invisibility and compiling academic commentary on the subject).
5. Darren Leonard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 301–03 (2001). (“[C]ourts
have failed to recognize that the cumulative effect of multiple forms of discrimination may create a
unique type of victimization that differs in kind from the sum of individual acts of discrimination.”).
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Compounding this problem for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(“LGBT”) plaintiffs is the fact that LGBT plaintiffs do not have independently
protected status under federal employment discrimination statutes, along with
many other areas of antidiscrimination law.6 The LGBT7 grouping is composed of
both sexual orientation minorities, including gays, lesbians, and bisexuals,8 as well
as gender minorities,9 encompassing transgender individuals.10 Twenty-three
states include gays and lesbians as protected classes under employment
discrimination statutes, and approximately one-third of states provide coextensive
protections for transgender individuals.11 Yet, efforts to include these groups as
protected classes in federal employment discrimination statutes have failed to pass
Congress since 1977.12 While the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (“ENDA”),
which would prohibit employment discrimination against all members of the

6. LGBT individuals are not explicitly covered by Title VII, the primary federal employment
discrimination statute, for example. See infra Section III.A. Similarly, LGBT individuals are not a
uniformly protected class at the federal level for purposes of housing discrimination. See, e.g., Ending
Housing Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Individuals and Their Families,
HUD, https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/LGBT_
Housing_Discrimination (last visited April 18, 2017) (“[t]he Fair Housing Act does not specifically
include sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited bases [for discrimination]. However,
discrimination against a lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) person may be covered by the
Fair Housing Act if it is based on non-conformity with gender stereotypes”).
7. Although lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender identities are subsumed into the “LGBT”
grouping, it is important to note that “[t]ransgenderism. . .is distinct from homosexuality (attraction to
members of one’s own biological sex) and transvestitism or cross-dressing (dressing in clothes usually
worn by those of the opposite biological sex).” Edward J. Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA:
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 LAW & SEXUALITY
61, 74 (2011).
8. While this paper will include bisexuals in discussions about LGBT discrimination, this paper
does not delve as deeply into issues affecting bisexuals, as is common in the academic literature. For
an in-depth exploration of this phenomenon, see Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual
Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
9. Gender Identity is defined as “a person’s innate, deeply felt psychological identification as
male or female, which may or may not correspond to the person’s body or designated sex at birth
(meaning what sex was originally listed on a person’s birth certificate).” Reeves and Decker, supra note
7, at 74 (quoting Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Terminology and Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/equal-opportunity/gender-identity-termsdefinitio
ns.asp).
10. “Transgender individuals identify emotionally and psychologically with the opposite
biological sex and usually live in the gender role opposite the one they were biologically born into or
assigned. Transgender individuals do not always use surgery or medication to alter their bodies, but
many do seek surgical alteration of their anatomy to conform to their desired biological sex.” Id. at 74–
75.
11. Crosby Burns et al., Gay and Transgender Discrimination in the Public Sector: Why It’s a Problem
for State and Local Governments, Employees, and Taxpayers, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Aug. 30, 2012,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2012/08/30/35114/gay-and-transgenderdiscrimination-in-the-public-sector/.
12. H.R. 8269, 95th Cong. (1977). Proposed employment discrimination statutes protecting LGBT
individuals have sought to either amend Title VII to include LGBT plaintiffs, or enact a separate
employment discrimination statute. See, e.g., J. Banning Jasiunas, Can a “Separate but Equal” Federal
Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000).
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LGBT community, has gained traction in Congress in recent years, 13 the enactment
of this statute would not remediate the issue of intersectional discrimination,
either in the intra-LGBT context or for intersectional plaintiffs more generally.
Because neither sexual orientation nor gender identity are expressly
protected classes in federal employment discrimination statutes, intersectional
LGBT plaintiffs can actually lose the ability to bring a successful claim based on
other protected characteristics.14 For example, a Latino homosexual employee in a
state with no employment discrimination statute covering sexual orientation
could lawfully be discriminated against for his sexual orientation. Even if the
employee attempted to bring a race-discrimination claim, the employer could be
absolved of liability by arguing that the discrimination was instead primarily
predicated on sexual orientation rather than race. Sexual orientation
discrimination would serve as a legally sanctioned sword, in this case permitting
an employer to avoid a claim of race discrimination by conceding blatant sexual
orientation discrimination.
The employment discrimination landscape is arguably bleakest for a
transgender bisexual plaintiff, however, who lacks uniform coverage under
federal employment discrimination law for both sexual orientation and gender
identity. This paper delves into the issue of intra-LGBT intersectional invisibility
in the employment discrimination context and critiques ENDA for its potential to
reinforce, rather than remediate, intersectional invisibility in employment
discrimination law.
Discrimination against subclasses of protected groups is an increasingly
common occurrence in the modern workplace, yet employment discrimination
law fails to provide meaningful redress for plaintiffs who experience
discrimination on the basis of more than one trait. 15 This paper argues that as the
demography of the workplace becomes increasingly intersectional,16 and as the
LGBT subgroups attain protected class status in the employment discrimination
context at the federal level, employment discrimination jurisprudence must evolve
to embrace claims by plaintiffs who belong to more than one protected category to

13. “The LGBT community may soon win a legal victory that has been decades in the making:
passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). As passage of the bill becomes more
likely, debates about how much to compromise for that victory have become increasingly important.”
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 209, 209
(2008).
14. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 302–03 (Arguing that discrimination was based on sexual
orientation rather than on a protected class under Title VII is known as the “Sexual Orientation
Loophole”). See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW U. L. REV. 205, 242–43 (2009)
(“employers are already using this defense - indeed, with great success”).
15. See Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory
in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1008 (2011) (“Intersectional claims have increased
dramatically over time”). See also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (discussing the failure of antidiscrimination law to address intersectional
identities).
16. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and the Future of the Protected Class
Approach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463 (2012).

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

THE NEW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

111

achieve the underlying goals of antidiscrimination law.17 Given the prevalence of
intersectionality in the LGBT community, the existence of intra-LGBT
intersectionality, and the current momentum for expanding employment
discrimination through legislative efforts, it is necessary to consider
intersectionality as an integral part of any effort to remediate LGBT discrimination
in particular, and to address gaps in the law for marginalized plaintiffs in
employment discrimination law more generally.
This article first discusses the legal origins of intersectional invisibility, and
the role that courts have played in affirming the single-axis framework in
employment discrimination jurisprudence. The following section addresses the
phenomenon of LGBT intersectionality and raises the issue of intra-LGBT
intersectionality, arguing that current efforts to prohibit LGBT discrimination in
the workplace would leave both LGBT intersectionality and intra-LGBT
intersectionality unaccounted for. This article next addresses the scant options for
intersectional plaintiffs under the current single-axis framework, demonstrating
the limits of this analytical approach to providing meaningful recompense for
intersectional employees. The article next articulates judicial and legislative reform
options, which would incorporate intersectionality into the mainstream of
employment discrimination jurisprudence. The final section briefly concludes.
II. INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY AND THE ROOTS OF INTERSECTIONAL
INVISIBILITY
A. The Single-Axis Framework in Employment Discrimination Law
Over the past half-century, American antidiscrimination law has made
meaningful strides towards remediating many forms of overt discrimination,
particularly in the employment context. The most prominent federal employment
discrimination statute is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
employment discrimination “because of… race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”18 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)19 and Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”)20 add to Title VII’s canon of protections for
employees by outlawing discrimination on the basis of disability and age
17. “The policy rationale behind [employment discrimination legislation] was fairly simple:
employers should focus only on characteristics relevant to employment when making employment
decisions, and the enumerated traits listed in Title VII will almost never have any bearing on whether
someone can perform a certain job.” Cody Perkins, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v.
Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). While Title VII has been successful in eradicating certain overt
discriminatory practices in the workplace, Title VII is also limited in its efficacy. For one, Title VII only
covers five protected classes: race, color, sex, national origin and religion. This leaves many groups
unprotected. Additionally, not all employers are subject to the requirements of Title VII. Researchers
have estimated that up to nineteen percent of the American labor force is not covered by Title VII. Levit,
supra note 16, at 470. “While laws prohibiting discrimination were first developed following the Civil
War, they failed to have the impact that they were designed to create.” Jourdan Day, Note, Closing the
Loophole—Why Intersectional Claims are Needed to Address Discrimination Against Older Women, 75 OHIO
ST. L. J. 447, 449 (2014).
19. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
20. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

112 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

Volume 24:107 2017

respectively. Additionally, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(“PDA”), which prohibits discrimination against women on the basis of pregnancy
or family status.21 Currently, Congress is considering the Employment
Nondiscrimination Act (“ENDA”), which would broaden the scope of
employment discrimination law by making discrimination on the basis of both
sexual orientation and gender identity illegal.22
Despite legislation that prohibits workplace discrimination, many employees
continue to face on-the-job discrimination.23 Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the
PDA, and, if it passes, ENDA, create a patchwork of employment discrimination
protections. However, workplace discrimination persists in numerous significant,
albeit less overt forms, and current employment discrimination laws are ill
equipped to handle these new iterations of workplace discrimination. 24 For
example, a landmark study conducted by prominent labor economics researchers

21. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1994); see also Laura T. Kessler, The
Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic
and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 371 (2001) (discussing the impact of the PDA on gender
discrimination).
22. “The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011 (ENDA) proposes to essentially extend
Title VII protections to Americans who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, making it illegal for employers to
hire, fire, refuse to promote, or treat in a hostile manner persons based on their sexual orientation” and
gender identity. Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of
Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 170 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
“As proposed, ENDA would define ‘sexual orientation’ as meaning ‘homosexuality, heterosexuality,
or bisexuality,’ and ‘gender identity’ as ‘gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other
gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated
sex at birth.’” Reeves & Decker, supra note 7, at 78 (internal citations omitted). According to many
scholars and political commentators, it is likely that ENDA, or a functional equivalent thereof, will pass
congress within the next few years. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 13. Although ENDA failed to pass
in the House of Representatives, the bill passed the Senate with bipartisan support, which itself is an
historic event. See, e.g., Michael Memoli, Senate Votes to Ban Discrimination Against LGBT Workers, THE
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-senate-gays-20131108,
0,1055292.story#axzz2kOnkUMErj. As this paper discusses, however, ENDA is limited in scope relative
to Title VII. For example, plaintiffs under ENDA would not be able to raise disparate impact claims.
See, e.g., Employment Nondiscrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act.
23. “Title VII has failed to eradicate discrimination from the workplace, as evidenced by the
93,277 bias discrimination complaints filed against employers in 2009 alone. Title VII has made great
strides in improving workplace opportunities and mitigating workplace discrimination since its
enactment, but change is necessary in order to foster increased successes and to achieve its broad
remedial policy goals. Title VII does not protect all workers against wrongful employment
discrimination, and it does not adequately or consistently protect the workers that it was supposed to
cover, either.” Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment Opportunities
and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25, 28 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
24. “As times changed, so too did the nature of discrimination. What was once blatant became
more subtle. Discussions that were once dominated by a Black-White paradigm were challenged by
peoples of varying shades of brown. Gender, class, language, accent, color, and national origin began
to complicate the analysis and served to differentially situate racialized groups and individuals within
those groups. Unfortunately, legal analysis and doctrinal frameworks failed to keep up with the times.
Today, these frameworks and outmoded ways of thinking about discrimination present considerable
challenges for plaintiffs.” Jones, supra note 3, at 679–80 (internal citations omitted).
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demonstrated that job applicants with “ethnic-sounding” names received
substantially fewer interview invitations relative to those with “race-neutral”
names, regardless of industry or occupation level.25 To research this phenomenon,
economists sent numerous employers resumes from fake candidates, all of whom
were substantively equivalent, except for the fact that some resumes used raceneutral names, such as Sarah and David, while others had “ethnic-sounding”
names like Lakesha and Jamal.26 The difference in responses to candidates based
on name was not negligible: prospective employees with “ethnic-sounding”
names were twice as unlikely to receive a call back for a job interview. 27 Further,
the unemployment gap between blacks and whites was the same in 2014 as it was
in 1964, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted. 28 Thus, even though
discrimination on the basis of race, along with Title VII’s other enumerated
categories, may be formally illegal, not all forms of discrimination are captured by
such prohibitions, and inequality and marginalization persist as a consequence of
this gap in the law.29
Intersectional discrimination is one form of discrimination that has eluded
most efforts at reform.30 As scholars have noted, “intersectionality is a conceptual
blind spot for antidiscrimination law.”31 Intersectional discrimination is
unaccounted for in the employment discrimination context because the vast
majority of courts adhere to a single-axis framework for analyzing discrimination
claims.32 The single-axis framework refers to an unwritten expectation that a
plaintiff frames a claim of discrimination as being based on one protected trait or
another, but not as a result of the confluence of two or more traits.33 Consequently,
most courts fail to recognize that individuals who identify as members of multiple
marginalized groups may experience discrimination differently than individuals
who are members of only one protected class. 34 Few courts recognize actionable

25. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
Working Paper No. 9873, 2003, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate is Consistently Twice That of Whites, PEW RESEARCH,
Aug. 21, 2013, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/through-good-times-andbad-black-unemployment-is-consistently-double-that-of-whites/.
29. See, e.g., Niedrich, supra note 23, at 28–29.
30. “Intersectionality theory posits that individuals may be subject to adverse treatment as a result
of the convergence, or intersection, of two or more protected classifications.” Jones, supra note 3, at 668;
See also Crenshaw, supra note 15.
31. Zachary Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 934–35 (2014).
32. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 15. Crenshaw’s article first articulated the idea of the singleaxis framework, which refers to the legal presumption of single-trait discrimination. Id. Thus,
discrimination claims are adjudicated on the basis of one claim or another, often failing to recognize
the unique experiences of subclasses of protected groups. Id.
33. Id.
34. “Crenshaw’s analysis demonstrates that antidiscrimination doctrine imagines the
quintessential race plaintiffs as men of color and the model sex discrimination plaintiffs as white
women. The claims of women of color are viewed as presenting an unprotected ‘sub-category’ or
‘special class’ and as placing civil rights doctrine on a dangerous slippery slope.” Hutchinson, supra
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claims based on intersectionality, despite the increasing prevalence of
discrimination faced by subclasses of protected groups. 35 The reasons for this will
be explored more fully in part II.B, infra.
The paradigmatic example of intersectional discrimination is black women.36
Kimberlé Crenshaw, the pioneering scholar behind intersectionality theory,
articulated the constraints imposed by the single-axis approach to employment
discrimination jurisprudence in particular, and antidiscrimination law more
broadly:
With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more apparent how dominant
conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination as
disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis. I want to suggest further
that this single-axis framework erases Black women in the conceptualization,
identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry
to the experiences of otherwise-privileged members of the group. In other words,
in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or
class-privileged blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race- and classprivileged women.37

Under Crenshaw’s articulation of the single-axis framework, comparing the
experiences of black women to black men or white women is inapt.38 Unlike black
men, who benefit from male privilege, and white women, who benefit from white
privilege, black women are unable to claim privilege through either axis. As a
result, black women experience a unique type of discrimination and have a set of
life experiences that differ from both black males and white women, 39 yet the
experiences of these dissimilar groups will be used to assess the veracity of a race
or sex discrimination claim.40 This problem arises for many other intersectional

note 5, at 302 (internal citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 31, at 932 (“The problem, of course, is that modern discrimination
is a messy enterprise that defies neat categorization. In its attempt to impose order on something
disorderly, employment discrimination law neglects the needs of employees who face discrimination
aimed at multiple parts of their identity.”).
36. Although black women remain the paradigmatic example of intersectional discrimination, as
the focal point of intersectional scholarship and as a group that has successfully asserted claims of
intersectional discrimination, other groups, such as Asian women, have also successfully raised
intersectional discrimination claims and been addressed in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Jones, supra
note 3, at 668–69.
37. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 140. See also MELISSA HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN 91 (Yale 2011).
38. See, e.g., id. (discussing unique experiences of black women in the workplace: “[t]he workplace
is a particularly fraught terrain for black women who try both to earn professional respect and to guard
against the expectation that they are irrationally angry”).
39. “A black woman’s experience cannot be compared to the experience of either a black man or
a white woman. Neither of these latter examples captures the full range of stereotypes and prejudices
that attach uniquely to a black woman’s experience.” Kramer, supra note 31, at 932–33.
40. “In Degraffenreid v. General Motors, five African American women brought suit against General
Motors, alleging that the employer’s seniority system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination
against black women. The Eighth Circuit held that there was no sex discrimination because although
General Motors did not hire black women prior to 1964, it did hire white women.” Alina Hoffman &
Margarita Varona, Sexual Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 13 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 523, 553 (2012).
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plaintiffs.41 Courts have recognized claims by very few minority subclasses,
including black women and Asian women, 42 underscoring a need to broaden
antidiscrimination jurisprudence beyond the single-axis approach.
Intersectional invisibility is problematic for both minority workers in general
and LGBT employees in particular. The demography of the US workforce is
changing, which will likely increase the necessity for judicial recognition of
intersectional claims, particularly for groups who may not have previously been
considered intersectional. As some have noted, “[b]y 2042, a generation from now,
racial and ethnic minorities will become a majority of the U.S. population and
whites will be a racial minority. In roughly that same timespan, the number of
multiracial individuals in the United States will triple.”43 Further, with women
comprising a larger proportion of the workforce, and LGBT workers coming out
of the closet in higher numbers, the frequency of intersectional discrimination
claims will inevitably increase, warranting expanding current employment
discrimination jurisprudence to recognize the viability of these claims.
B. Judicial Responses to Intersectional Claims
Despite the prevalence of intersectional discrimination in the employment
context, there has not been widespread judicial acceptance of intersectional theory.
“Rather than appreciate the multidimensional nature of discrimination and the
dynamic interaction of various identity traits, courts generally demand a specific
injury linked to discrimination based on a specific trait.” 44 Some courts have
allowed black women, along with a few other distinct minority subclasses, to bring
intersectional claims, recognizing the unique historic social positions of
marginalization experienced by these sub-groups.45 For example, in Jefferies v.
Harris Community Action Association, the Fifth Circuit “implicitly recognized that
black women throughout American history have worked in subservient roles and
have been subjected to adverse conditions that have not been imposed upon either
black men or white women.”46 Although the Jefferies Court allowed the plaintiffs
in that case to bring an intersectional discrimination claim, this holding has been
extended in only a handful of subsequent cases.47 The holding of Jefferies is limited
by its own terms, moreover, because the case recognized the unique experiences
of black women in finding that the intersectional claim was viable. 48 This is quite

41. “The complexities of joint racial and gender classification are not limited to black female
plaintiffs. Black men have also faced specific and unique discrimination in employment settings.” Id.
at 554.
42. “Thus, an Asian woman may allege that she was discriminated against not because she is a
woman, or Asian, but because she is an Asian woman.” Jones, supra note 3, at 668–69.
43. Levit, supra note 16, at 464.
44. Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1207 (2012).
45. See, e.g., AVERY ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
46. Id. at 48.
47. See Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
48. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032.
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different from articulating a universal cause of action for plaintiffs based on
intersectional discrimination.
In addition to black women, Asian women are one of the few other
intersectional subclasses that courts have allowed to bring intersectional claims. 49
Courts have recognized that Asian women face discrimination that does not
impact Asian men or white women.50 Scholars have argued for the recognition of
numerous additional protected subclasses, including older women, 51 black
Muslims,52 and LGBT people of color.53 Given that neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress have formally addressed intersectionality, claims of intersectional
discrimination remain legally precarious.
Many courts have been skeptical of intersectional claims, to put it mildly. The
most unequivocal and vehement rejection of intersectionality theory was
articulated in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division.54 In DeGraffenreid,
the Eighth Circuit rejected a black woman’s claim of intersectional
discrimination.55 The court characterized allowing a judicial cause of action for
intersectionality as providing a “super remedy” for minorities subjected to
discrimination on intersectional bases. 56 The Degraffenreid Court held that the
“lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race
discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of
both.”57
It is important to challenge the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of
intersectionality as providing a “super remedy” because plaintiffs in intersectional
discrimination claims do not seek any extra remedy. Rather, intersectional
plaintiffs seek only recognition of unique discrimination that results from the
confluence of membership in multiple marginalized groups. Intersectional
plaintiffs are not seeking any extra remedy or correspondingly higher damages
based on multiple forms of discrimination. Providing equal opportunity for
intersectional plaintiffs to bring a discrimination claim is in no way tantamount to
a “super remedy,” but is instead a step toward substantive equality for
intersectional individuals.
While the EEOC recently incorporated a statement in its compliance manual
interpreting Title VII to allow a cause of action for intersectional discrimination, 58
courts have not cited this provision in published opinions. Moreover, the EEOC’s

49. Jones, supra note 3, at 668–69.
50. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Jones, supra note 3, at 668–69.
51. Day, supra note 18, at 453, 457.
52. Meri O. Triades, Finding a Hostile Work Environment: The Search for a Reasonable Reasonableness
Standard, 8 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 35, 72 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” For “Gay Whites?”: Race, Sexual Identity, And
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1368 (2001).
54. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
58. EEOC Compliance Manual, Race and Color Discrimination, § 15 (IV)(c), http://www.eeoc.gov
/policy/docs/race-color.html#IVC.

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

THE NEW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

117

recognition of intersectional discrimination perpetuates a problematic feature of
intersectional discrimination thus far, which is the recognition of only certain
intersectional classes, rather than an understanding of the myriad manifestations
of intersectionality in the workplace.59
There are at least three distinct reasons why intersectional claims have failed
to become accepted in mainstream discrimination jurisprudence. The first can be
traced to Title VII’s language, which uses a disjunctive ‘or’ in describing the
discrete minorities that are protected under the statute.60 Courts rejecting an
intersectional approach have indicated that the language of Title VII implies a
plaintiff may belong to one category, but not multiple.61 The text of the statute does
not explicitly provide a cause of action based on intersectional discrimination,
though this may be an amendment worth considering, which will be discussed in
greater depth in section V, infra.
The second factor that reinforces judicial reliance on the single-axis
framework is the four-step burden-shifting framework from McDonell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, through which a plaintiff can establish a claim of discrimination. 62
There are two ways in which this four-step burden-shifting framework
reemphasizes the law’s entrenched dependence on the single-axis framework.
Under the first step of McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make a prima facie
case of discrimination. This requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that “(1) he or she
belongs to a minority group; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified for the
position at issue; (3) despite his or her qualifications, he or she was not hired; and
(4) after his or her rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applications from other individuals.”63 The first prong of
McDonnell Douglas implicitly buttresses the single-axis framework by requiring a
plaintiff allege a claim as a member of a protected class, not one or more. A
protected class is generally understood as a member of a singular minority group,
thus formalizing the requirement that a discrimination claim be framed as an
either-or claim.64
If a plaintiff sufficiently articulates a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by

59. See id. The EEOC Compliance manual regarding intersectionality reads: “Title VII prohibits
discrimination not just because of one protected trait (e.g., race), but also because of the intersection of
two or more protected bases (e.g., race and sex). For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination against
African American women even if the employer does not discriminate against White women or African
American men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian American women from discrimination based on
stereotypes and assumptions about them ‘even in the absence of discrimination against Asian
American men or White women.’” Id.
60. “Much of the confusion for intersectionality centers around Congress’s use of the word “or”
in the text of Title VII, which protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” Bradley Allen Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 199, 208 (2006).
61. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
62. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
63. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black,
and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakesha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1290-92 (2005).
64. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 60, at 208.
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the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 65 This raises the second problem for intersectional
plaintiffs making a case of intersectional discrimination, which is the use of
statistics.66 An oft invoked method used by defendants to rebut the inference of
discrimination raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination is
through statistical evidence, which demonstrate that other ‘similarly situated’
employees at the workplace have not been treated discriminatorily, undermining
the reliability of the discrimination claim.67
The use of statistics in this context are problematic for at least two reasons.
First, statistics used to establish discrimination, can fail to account for the unique
experiences of subclasses of protected groups. As Crenshaw describes, there is an
apparent hierarchy among marginalized groups, with those marginalized along
only one axis, such as white women or black men, being nearer to the top. 68 The
experiences of those “at the top” of the hierarchy will nevertheless be used to
measure the legitimacy of an intersectional discrimination claim. Thus, if a black
woman is alleging race-sex intersectional discrimination, an employer might use
statistics that show that he has eight black employees, and ten female employees.
These statistics fail to reveal that seven of the black employees are men and nine
of the female employees are white. There is only one black woman, and her claim
can therefore be undermined. Use of statistics is thus problematic in this context.69
The second problem with the use of statistics in intersectional discrimination
cases is the lack of available comparator groups for intersectional plaintiffs. 70 For
example, in Moore v. Hughes Helicopter Inc, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize the

65. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
66. For a detailed discussion of the problematic aspects of using statistics in discrimination cases,
see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
67. There are two different ways courts use ‘similarly situated comparators’ to evaluate
discrimination claims: “Although not mentioned by the Court in McDonnell Douglas, many circuit
courts have added another element to the prima facie case. These courts require plaintiffs to
demonstrate “that a similarly situated person outside the protected class was treated better. Other
courts have held that a similarly situated comparator is one of the ways in which plaintiffs may prove
discrimination.” Day, supra note 18, at 453. Whether the court frames the similarly situated comparator
requirement as part of the prima facie case, or merely as an evidentiary advantage for plaintiffs, using
a similarly situated comparator is the most common way plaintiffs prove a claim of discrimination. Id.
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to find similarly situated comparators for an intersectional
plaintiff, making it even more difficult to prevail on a discrimination claim under the current
framework. See Goldberg, supra note 66.
68. “Crenshaw depicts this point visually with her metaphor of a basement that contains all
people who are discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or
physical ability. . .Those at the bottom of the basement are individuals fully disadvantaged by the
broad array of factors, while those at the top (near the ceiling) are disadvantaged by only a single factor.
She notes that this ceiling is also a floor, above which all those who are not disadvantaged by any factor
reside.” Areheart, supra note 60, at 211.
69. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., id. at 736 (intersectional plaintiffs “[struggle] under a comparator regime in part
because it can be difficult to decide who is the proper comparator—is it someone who shares neither
of the individual’s traits or shares one but not the other? In addition, because intersectional plaintiffs
are often few in number relative to all others in a workplace, decision makers tend to be skeptical of
the comparison’s probative value and are typically unwilling to conclude that comparatively worse
treatment is attributable to discriminatory intent rather than to the plaintiff’s idiosyncratic quirks”).
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challenge of proffering adequate statistical evidence for subclasses of protected
groups, dismissing the claim as a result:71
Presumably on the basis of Moore claiming discrimination as a black woman, the
court left her to support her claim with statistical evidence of discrimination
against black women. The court found Moore to be the only qualified black
woman employee in her particular unit, thereby leaving her with no statistically
significant evidence to prove a claim of discrimination against black women.72

A similar problem with the use of statistics arises in the disparate impact
realm. Disparate impact discrimination occurs when an employer promulgates a
facially neutral policy, which has a disproportionate impact on certain protected
classes.73
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff first must identify
a specific employment practice to be challenged, and then, through relevant
statistical analysis, must prove that the challenged practice has an adverse impact
on a protected group. In making these comparisons, a plaintiff must demonstrate
disparate impact with respect to the pool of qualified persons in the relevant labor
market for the given position.74

Given that it can be difficult to find similarly situated comparators, raising a
successful disparate impact claim can be exceedingly difficult for intersectional
plaintiffs.
One example of a policy with a disparate impact is one that requires female
employees75 to wear their hair straight.76 While this may seem like a race-neutral
grooming policy to some in that it applies equally to everyone and does not
explicitly mention race, it effectively embeds whiteness as the default racial
setting. This is because this policy fails to recognize that for some women, like
Black women, who have hair that naturally grows in a texture that is not straight,
the employer’s policy imposes an extra burden on these employees. Thus, this
policy may seem facially neutral, but has a disparate impact on black employees.
Under a disparate impact theory, a policy that has such a disparate impact
constitutes impermissible employment discrimination.77 However, the Eleventh
71. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
72. Areheart, supra note 60, at 210 (emphasis added).
73. “If discriminatory intent is the touchstone of disparate treatment, then discriminatory effect
is the touchstone of disparate impact. Disparate impact captures unintentional discrimination, cases in
which an employment policy is fair on its face but harms one group of employees more than another.”
Kramer, supra note 31, at 903. See also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (1975) (articulating the
importance of statistics in disparate impact claims).
74. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII,
98 GEO. L. J. 1079, 1121 (2010) (emphasis added).
75. Courts allow employers to impose different grooming requirements on male and female
employees who perform the same job, finding that such policies do not violate Title VII. See, e.g.,
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F. 3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing a claim of sex
discrimination brought by a female bartender at Harrah’s Casino who was fired for refusing to wear
makeup as required by the Casino grooming policy, even though the grooming policy imposed
different grooming standards on male and female bartenders).
76. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 74.
77. See also Green, 523 F.2d at 1290.
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Circuit recently upheld an employer’s policy of banning dreadlocks during the
interview process, despite the racial implications of doing so.78
Statistics are generally relied upon more heavily in this context, as employees
must make the prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination through
statistical evidence. Statistics in an intersectional disparate impact claim are not
dispositive for the same two reasons mentioned above: For failing to capture the
unique experiences of marginalized subclasses, and ignoring the reality that
finding similarly situated comparators can be difficult, if not impossible.
A third reason that intersectional discrimination theory has not been more
widely invoked in mainstream employment discrimination jurisprudence is
because the term discrimination itself is undefined in employment discrimination
statutes, except for the ADA.79 The leading definition cited by many courts is a
definition of discrimination promulgated by sponsors of the Civil Rights Act:
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor,
and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by
Section [703] are those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for
employment is not affected by this title.80

Because civil rights statutes do not specify either that intersectional
discrimination is a recognized type of discrimination, or that intersectionality is
actionable, courts have had the freedom to ignore intersectionality, despite the
lived experience of discrimination for intersectional plaintiffs.
III. LGBT INTERSECTIONALITY
Although lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) individuals
experience pervasive on-the-job discrimination,81 these groups are not protected
from such discrimination at the federal level, 82 or in the majority of states. 83
Intersectional discrimination is particularly consequential in the LGBT context for
78. Noel Gutierrez-Morfin, U.S. Court Rules Dreadlock Ban During Hiring Process Is Legal, NBC
NEWS, Sept. 21, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/u-s-court-rules-dreadlock-ban-duringhiring-process-legal-n652211.
79. Day, supra note 18, at 451.
80. Id. at 450–51.
81. “[E]mployment discrimination remains to this day a prevalent, pervasive problem for the
transgender community.” Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 423, 461 (2012).
82. See, e.g., id. at 425.
83. See, e.g., Burns et al., supra note 11 (cataloguing the extent to which each state protects LGBT
workers). As the report by Burns et al. demonstrates, there is a great deal of variation between states
in terms of whether discrimination against LGBT employees is prohibited by law, which LGBT
subgroups are covered, and whether the statute applies to both public and private sectors. For example,
some states only prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, thereby excluding transgender individuals
from coverage. Other states only prohibit sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination in
public sector employment, while others prohibit it in the private sector, and some prohibit
discrimination in both contexts. See id.
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two reasons. First, there is a high incidence of individuals who identify as LGBT
and also belong to another protected category.84 For example, racial minorities
identify as LGBT at the highest rates: 4.6% of Black Americans identify as LGBT, 85
4.3% of Asian Americans identify as LGBT, 4.0% of Latinos identify as LGBT. 86
White Americans, conversely, identify as LGBT at the lowest rate, 3.2%,87 despite
the construction of essentialized LGBT identity as predominantly white. 88
Individuals identifying as both racial minorities and LGBT have intersectional
race-sexual orientation identities, yet remain unaccounted for in the LGBT pursuit
of employment discrimination protection.
Second, intra-LGBT intersectional discrimination can occur against an
individual who identifies as both homosexual or bisexual and transgender,
demonstrating the limits of a single-axis approach to remedying intersectional
LGBT employment discrimination specifically, as well as highlighting a problem
that is endemic to current employment discrimination law more broadly. This is
hardly a theoretical problem: it is common for a transgender individual to identify
both as homosexual or bisexual and transgender.89 According to one study,
approximately one-third of transgender individuals identify as bisexual, with an
additional 12 to 16% percent identifying as homosexual or “queer.”90 Transgender
individuals who identify as a heterosexual, on the other hand, account for
approximately 30% of the transgender population.91
ENDA would not remedy this problem. Passing ENDA in its current form
would only address discrimination on a singular axis. This effectively means that
LGBT people of color, LGBT religious minorities, LGBT immigrants, LGBT elderly
people, and numerous other groups would not be able to raise a viable claim that
captured discrimination that occurred on the basis of more than one trait. This
leaves a significant proportion of LGBT people without comprehensive protection
from workplace discrimination.
Reforming employment discrimination law is a monumental undertaking,
demonstrated by decades of unsuccessful attempts to do so. 92 Given the growing
momentum for passing legislation that expands protected classes in employment
discrimination to include LGBT plaintiffs,93 and the import of intersectionality for
84. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Alexander Nourafshan, From Outsider Status to Insider and
Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT Politics, 42 FLA. ST. L. REV. 521 (2015).
85. Gary Gates & Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of U.S. Adults Identify as LGBT, GALLUP, Oct.
18, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig & Nourafshan, supra note 84.
89. See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Malloy, What Best to Protect Transsexuals From Discrimination: Using
Current Legislation or Adopting a New Judicial Framework?, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 283, 286 (2011)
(internal citations omitted).
90. Brett Genny Beemyn & Sue Rankin, Understanding Transgender Lives (book in development),
http://www.umass.edu/stonewall/uploads/listWidget/9002/Understanding%20Transgender%20Lives.
pdf.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Reeves & Decker, supra note 7, at 62.
93. See, e.g., LGBT Nondiscrimination Protections, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/lgbt-rights/
lgbt-nondiscrimination-protections; Lambda Legal, Equality Act: Frequently Asked Questions, http://
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LGBT plaintiffs directly, now is the appropriate occasion for considering
legislating intersectionality as part of employment discrimination reform.
A. LGBT Workplace Discrimination
There is pervasive discrimination against LGBT employees in the workplace
resulting in a number of consequences, including lower incomes and on-the-job
harassment for LGBT employees,94 despite widespread acknowledgment that
“there is no evidence that gays and lesbians do not function as effectively in the
workplace or that they contribute any less to society than do their heterosexual
counterparts.”95 In states where sexual orientation is included as a protected class
in employment discrimination statutes, claims of sexual orientation are brought
almost as frequently as claims of race and sex discrimination, despite the relatively
small proportion of the overall workforce made up of gays and lesbians. 96 This
demonstrates the dire need for extending employment discrimination protections
to include LGBT people.
Discrimination against gays and lesbians appears to be endemic to the
American workplace: 42% of gays and lesbians report experiencing harassment as
a result of their sexual orientation, and 16% report losing a job as a result of sexual
orientation.97 Interestingly, one-third of LGBT employees are not open with any
co-workers about their sexual orientation or gender identity,98 which could
suggest that some of these employees who are not out to anyone in the workplace
conceal their identity trait for fear of the resultant discrimination. 99 The
discrimination that openly gay and lesbian employees experience has many
tangible consequences, such as diminished income.100 Studies have demonstrated

www.lambdalegal.org/publications/20150723_equality-act-faq.
94. “Sexual orientation discrimination is a very real, very frequent problem in the American
workplace.” Shawn Clancy, The Queer Truth: The Need to Update Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation, 37
J. LEGIS. 119, 140 (2011). For a recent study quantifying LGBT employment discrimination, see Brad
Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination & Its Effects on LGBT People,
THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (2011); see also M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence
of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination 1998-2008, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 559 (2009).
95. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 325 Mont. 148, 162 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., concurring).
96. “[O]ut of every 10,000 gay workers, an average of four file discrimination complaints with
state agencies. That number is 3.9 for workers filing discrimination complaints based on race, and 5.2
for workers filing discrimination complaints based on their gender.” Burns et al., supra note 11, at 10.
There are over eight million self-identified LGBT employees in America, accounting for 6.3% of the
total workforce, which is composed of over 129 million people. Id. at 6. Seven million LGBT employees
work in the private sector, and over one million LGBT employees work in local, state and federal
government. Id.
97. Sears and Mallory, supra note 94, at 4. Notably, only twenty-five percent of survey
respondents in the Williams Institute study were openly homosexual with all of their co-workers. It is
possible that these discrimination figures would increase if more employees were openly homosexual.
Further, one might argue that the pressure to not be openly homosexual at work constitutes a form of
discrimination, known as covering. For the authoritative discussion of covering, see Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769 (2002).
98. Sears & Mallory, supra note 94, at 4.
99. See Yoshino, supra note 97.
100. See Onwuachi-Willig & Nourafshan, supra note 84.
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that gay men earn up to 32% less than their heterosexual counterparts, for
example.101
While gays and lesbians are disadvantaged in terms of employment and
income relative to heterosexuals, there are also alarming inequalities among gays
and lesbians in terms of income, wealth, and employment that vary dramatically
by race.102 For example, black male same-sex couples earn $23,000 less than white
male same-sex couples, and black female same-sex couples earn $21,000 less than
white female same-sex couples.103 Similarly, Latino male same-sex couples earn
$27,000 less than white male same-sex couples, and Latino female same-sex
couples earn $24,000 less than white female same-sex couples.104 Further, LGBT
people of color are much more likely to be employed in lower-paying government
jobs and to lack private health coverage. 105
Discrimination against gays and lesbians in the workplace is unquestionably
rampant, but transgender individuals report even higher levels of on-the-job
discrimination, social marginalization, and economic hardship.106 As one scholar
notes:
[T]ranssexuals are victims of discrimination in virtually every aspect of their lives.
Socially, they are outcast because they do not fit into traditional notions of gender.
Legally, they are subject to a variety of obstacles that the average person would
never have to face. In thirty-four states, transsexuals are unable to change their
birth certificate to accommodate their gender identity and expression, which, in
turn, can lead to difficulty obtaining a driver’s license or passport. They are unable
to obtain marriage licenses, which can affect intestacy and child custody rights.

101. Badgett et al., supra note 94, at 559 (“A growing number of studies using data from the
National Health and Social Life Survey (‘NHSLS’), the General Social Survey (‘GSS’), the United States
Census, and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (‘NHANES III’) show that gay
men earn 10% to 32% less than otherwise similar heterosexual men”).
102. See, e.g., Gary J. Gates, PhD, Same Sex Couples In Census 2010: Race And Ethnicity. THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE; Alain Dang & Somjen Frazer, Black Same-Sex Households in the United States: A Report from the
2000 Census, THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE (2005), http://
www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/2000BlackSameSexHouseholds.pdf;
Jason Cianciotto, Hispanic and Latino Same Sex Couple Households in the United States: A Report from the
2000 Census, THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE (2005), http://www.lgbt
racialequity.org/publications/HispanicLatinoHouseholdsUS.pdf. For an in-depth discussion of
inequality among subgroups of the LGBT community, see Onwuachi-Willig & Nourafshan, supra note
84.
103. Dang & Frazer, supra note 102, at 5.
104. Id.
105. Id.; Cianciotto, supra note 102.
106. “A recent national survey of almost 6,500 transgender individuals found that nearly half of
respondents had experienced an adverse employment action—denial of a job, denial of a promotion,
or termination of employment—as a result of their transgender status and/or gender nonconformity.
Fifty percent reported harassment by someone at work, forty-five percent stated that co-workers had
referred to them using incorrect gender pronouns ‘repeatedly and on purpose,’ and fifty-seven percent
confessed that they delayed their gender transition in order to avoid discriminatory actions and
workplace abuse.” Lee, supra note 81, at 424–25 (internal citations omitted); see also, Jaime M. Grant et
al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey 2, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. AND NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org
/reports_and_research/ntds.
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They even face discrimination based on their decision to use either a “male” or
“female” restroom. To date, existing anti-discrimination laws have been largely
ineffective in remedying the injustices and difficulties that transsexual individuals face.107

In light of this discrimination, and lack of a reliable remedy, LGBT rights
activists have sought employment protections in judicial and legislative forums
for decades. “Starting in the 1950s, homosexuals waged a multi-front struggle for
the right to express a gay identity at work. Their activism was coterminous with
similar workplace rights campaigns fought by women and racial minorities.”108
While sex and race were granted protected-class status under Title VII, attempts
to include sexual orientation as a protected class have been introduced in every
session of Congress for decades, yet these efforts have not been successful.109
In addition to efforts to include LGBT individuals as protected classes under
federal legislation, legal advocates have pursued judicially based protections for
LGBT employees as well. LGBT legal advocates have sought to expand Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination to include gender identity and sexual
orientation, which is a strategy that has yielded mixed results. 110 The court has
greatly expanded its conception of sex discrimination since the passage of Title
VII, moving from a narrow conception of sex discrimination that was limited to
biological sex111 to include discrimination based on the more expansive concept of
gender.112 In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia: “The

107. Malloy, supra note 89, at 284 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Niedrich,
supra note 23, at 30 (“Unemployment and under-employment are huge issues for transgender people—
and particularly for transsexual people who often lose their jobs during or after their gender
transitions. . .Within the transgender community, it is not uncommon to find people dramatically
underemployed regardless of their experience or background.”) (internal citations omitted).
108. Katherine Turk, “Our Militancy is in Our Openness”: Gay Employment Rights Activism in
California and the Question of Sexual Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 423, 425–26 (2013)
(internal citations omitted).
109. “Current federal law generally does not prohibit workplace discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity. For over a decade now, advocates of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender (GLBT) community have sought to change this with proposed federal legislation—the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would prohibit such discrimination
nationwide.” Reeves & Decker, supra note 7, at 62.
110. See, e.g., Turk, supra note 108. See also Sari M. Alamuddin, Seventh Circuit Extends Title VII
Protections to Sexual Orientation, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Apr. 7, 2017, http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/seventh-circuit-extends-title-vii-protections-to-sexual-orientation (“[o]n April 4 [2017], the
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This marks the first time a federal court of appeals has extended
Title VII’s protections to claims based on sexual orientation.”).
111. “It has become an academic norm to use the term ‘sex’ to refer to gonadal, chromosomal, or
genital anatomy and to use the term ‘gender’ to refer to the socially expected behaviors and preferences
commonly ascribed to each sex.” Mark Berghausen, Intersex Employment Discrimination: Title VII and
Anatomical Sex Non-Conformity, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (2011).
112. “Each individual maintains a particularized sex and gender.” Anton Marino, Transgressions of
Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections Against Wrongful Employment Termination on the Basis of
the Transgender Identity, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 865, 869 (2013). Sex refers to biological sex,
while gender refers to the social construct that accompanies gender. “[S]ex is best described as the
outside physical or perceived surface identity of a person.” Id. at 871. On the other hand, “[g]ender-

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

THE NEW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

125

word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural attitudinal
characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive of the sexes. That
is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male.” 113 To
expand Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to include gender, the court
created the sex-stereotyping theory.114 Sex-stereotyping theory was first
articulated in the 1989 Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and holds
that an employer cannot predicate an employment decision based on stereotyped
notions of how men and women ought to behave. 115
A number of courts have construed sex-stereotyping theory to encompass
discrimination against transgender individuals. 116 “The sex-stereotyping doctrine
would seem to be a boon to the transgender community, as transgenderism is
defined in significant part by nonconformity with stereotypical gender
expectations.”117 This interpretation has gained traction in numerous courts, and
the EEOC affirmed the inclusion of transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision.118 However, the Supreme Court has yet to affirm this
interpretation of Title VII, and some circuit courts have explicitly rejected the
extension of sex-stereotyping to include transgender plaintiffs.119 It would be
premature, therefore, to consider transgender inclusion under Title VII as settled
law.
While transgender plaintiffs may have been moderately successful bringing
discrimination claims under Title VII’s sex discrimination provision, courts have
not consistently adopted an interpretation of sex-stereotyping theory that includes
gay and lesbian plaintiffs.120 In states that do not include sexual-orientation
expression is the manifestation of one’s inner self and is frequently equated with socially normative,
dichotomous Euro-American stereotypes of what it means to be a man or a woman.” Id.
113. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Perkins, supra note 17, at 428–29.
115. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (“Sex Stereotyping Theory” prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of failing to conform to sex stereotypes under Title VII).
116. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp.
2.d 203 (D.C. Dist., 2006); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). Conversely, some courts
have rejected an interpretation of Title VII that covers transgender plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination
against a person who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body who believes
himself to be female.”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F. 3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
117. Lee, supra note 81, at 434.
118. “Recently, courts have become much more receptive to finding that discrimination against
transgender people is impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII.” Perkins, supra note 17, at 435–
36 (internal citations omitted). See also Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012) (interpreting Title VII’s sex discrimination provision to cover transgender discrimination
claims).
119. “There is now a division in the law between the jurisdictions that protect transgender
plaintiffs under Title VII and those that do not.” Berghausen, supra note 111, at 1306.
120. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Dandan v. Radisson Hotel
Lisle, No. 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d
748, (8th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.1978); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.1977); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F.Supp. 456 (N.D.Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354
(9th Cir.1978).
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discrimination as a protected class, which is more than half of states, an employer
can lawfully terminate a gay employee that endures explicitly offensive taunts
such as “fagboy” and “Tinkerbell” in the workplace, and loses his job for
complaining about it.121 In the past, the EEOC has similarly rejected an
interpretation of Title VII’s sex provision as including homosexual and bisexual
plaintiffs.122 While it may not be desirable for plaintiffs who experience
discrimination based on sexual orientation to be deprived of a legal remedy, it is
important for courts to disaggregate sex, gender and sexual orientation. 123
Distinguishing sex from sexual orientation is crucial for ensuring the judicial
viability of intra-LGBT intersectional claims,124 which will be discussed further in
section III.B infra.
B. The Precariousness of Intersectional LGBT Claims
Although both gender identity and sexual orientation would be covered as
protected classes under ENDA,125 and the underlying aims of expanding
employment discrimination protections under ENDA may be normatively
desirable, this legislation fails to recognize the looming problem of intersectional
discrimination, both in the intra-LGBT context, and as it applies more broadly to
other intersectional LGBT plaintiffs. In a leading treatise on employment
discrimination, the authors presciently pose the question, “[i]f Congress enacts
ENDA, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited under
federal law, should gay black males constitute a subclass that is protected on the
basis that they belong to two minority groups-people of color and gay men?”126
While the answer should be yes, according to some scholars, the structure of
ENDA as a non-Title VII amendment undermines the viability of this option.127
ENDA thus preserves intersectional invisibility, as it pertains to intersectional
LGBT plaintiffs by failing to expressly embrace intersectional claims. While this
article argues that ENDA is deeply flawed because of the statute’s failure to
address intersectionality, it is also worth noting here that ENDA would expressly
deny LGBT plaintiffs the opportunity to raise disparate impact claims.128 As one
scholar explains:
After years of failed attempts to add “sexual orientation” to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, ENDA’s proponents decided they would have a better chance
with a stand-alone bill stripped of several of Title VII’s protections: they gave up
121. Dandan, 2000 WL 336528, at *1–4.
122. “While there may be no binding precedent from the EEOC stating that sexual orientation is
covered under Title VII, there is binding precedent regarding transgender people.” Perkins, supra note
17, at 439.
123. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 57 (1995).
124. For extensive discussion on the judicial significance of disentangling sex, gender and sexual
orientation, see id.
125. Reeves & Decker, supra note 7; see also Lee, supra note 81, at 425–26.
126. AVERY ET AL., supra note 2, at 467.
127. See, e.g., Day, supra note 18, at 449.
128. See, e.g., The Employment Nondiscrimination Act, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.
hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act.
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disparate impact claims and affirmative action as a remedy for proven
discrimination.129

Disparate impact claims have been an important source of redress for racial
and gender minorities, yet this option would be unavailable under the terms of
ENDA. If passed in its current form, it is likely that ENDA would have to be
supplemented with another statute expanding employment discrimination
coverage for LGBT plaintiffs to include a disparate impact cause of action.
Given that LGBT individuals are not protected under federal employment
discrimination statutes, intersectionality can operate as a sword for employers. 130
Under current law, employers can avoid discrimination on another trait by
blatantly admitting to engaging in sexual orientation discrimination.131 As one
scholar explains:
[B]ecause sexual orientation remains an unprotected category in federal statutory
and constitutional civil rights law, discriminators may willingly concede sexual
orientation discrimination when some evidence of discriminatory action exists,
but deny racial or gender discrimination. The precarious status of sexual
orientation in civil rights law, therefore, allows for the furtherance of racial
subjugation and patriarchy, as defendants package their racism and sexism in
homophobic terms in order to escape liability.132

In intersectional LGBT cases, “courts do not recognize ‘intersecting’
discrimination; they have found that evidence of sexual orientation discrimination
negates any possibility that defendants also engage in racial discrimination; and
they have refused to accept arguments that plaintiffs face unique discrimination
as gays and lesbians of color.”133 Thus, if a Latino homosexual plaintiff alleged race
and sexual orientation discrimination, it would be possible for the employer to
avoid liability on the race discrimination claim if he can claim that sexual
orientation discrimination was instead the motivating factor. 134
ENDA’s intersectionality problem is not only substantive, but also structural.
If enacted as a freestanding statute, an intersectional LGBT plaintiff may not be
able to combine a discrimination claim under a Title VII protected class, like race,
with an intersectional claim of LGBT discrimination, because the causes of action
arise from different statutes. This problem has been illustrated in intersectional

129. Hendricks, supra note 13, at 209.
130. Hutchinson, supra note 15, at 302–03. See also Kramer, supra note 15, at 243.
131. This catch-22 for intersectional plaintiffs is apparent in a gender discrimination case: “What
results is double punishment for a homosexual person: a homosexual person is more likely to be subject
to gender discrimination for not fitting in, and is at the same time less likely to have a day in court.”
Clancy, supra note 95, at 131.
132. Hutchinson, supra note 15, at 302–03 (internal citations omitted); see also, Ryan Castle, The Gay
Accent, Gender, and Title VII Employment Discrimination, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1943, 1943–44 (2013)
(“Because Title VII does not protect employees from sexual orientation-based discrimination, plaintiffs
who are or are perceived to be of a sexual minority have difficulty proving a valid sex-based
discrimination claim in federal court.”) (internal citations omitted).
133. Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 302–03.
134. “In the context of race and sexuality discrimination claims, the unprotected status of sexual
orientation in civil rights jurisprudence, along with judicial essentialism, actually provides an incentive
for defendants to concede homophobic intent as a way of masking and obscuring racism.” Id. at 306.
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claims raised in the ADEA/Title VII context.135 A plaintiff may be able to bring two
distinct claims under the two statutes, but this is different than bringing a single
claim for discrimination based on multiple protected characteristics.
The advent of exploiting the unprotected status of homosexuality under
federal employment discrimination laws is hardly a new phenomenon. Employers
in the past have avoided liability in employment discrimination cases brought by
sexual-orientation minorities, even when race and gender minorities succeed in
the same case: 136
Despite facing such activist pressure, [the company] did not recognize its workers’
right to enact or imply a gay identity on the job. Whereas its [parent company] had
reached a landmark $38,000,000 settlement with women and minorities alleging
systemic sex and race discrimination that same year, the company openly
defended its policy of denying employment to workers who did not fit
heterosexual norms.137

Many intersectional LGBT individuals are already disenfranchised, both
socially and economically, relative to white LGBT counterparts. 138 If an
intersectional LGBT plaintiff loses the ability to bring a claim under an alreadyprotected category, this likely exacerbates the socioeconomic inequality affecting
many intersectional LGBT people.
Even if LGBT employees gain protected status under ENDA, or substantively
equivalent legislation, this will only partially reform the employment landscape
for LGBT employees. While intersectionality would no longer strip an
intersectional plaintiff of otherwise protected status, ENDA also contains no
language addressing intersectionality. Because ENDA is not an amendment to
Title VII, but instead a separate statute, there is a structural impediment to raising
a true intersectional claim. As has been demonstrated in the context of age-gender
intersectional claims, courts do not readily allow plaintiffs to combine causes of
action that arise from two different statutes. 139 This analytic hurdle would likely
exacerbate the reluctance courts have already demonstrated towards accepting
intersectional claims.
ENDA would also fail to address the statistical issues facing plaintiffs. As
discussed in section II.B, supra, the use of statistical evidence is problematic in
intersectional claims because statistics can fail to adequately reflect the experiences
of marginalized subgroups. There is an additional problem with the use of
statistics of particular relevance in the LGBT context: the difficulty of finding a
sufficiently large comparator group for LGBT employees, particularly for
intersectional employees.140 For example, in order for a gay Latino male to survive
135. See, e.g., Day, supra note 18, at 449 (discussing the impediments to filing intersectional age and
sex claims because courts have held that the age claim arising from the ADEA cannot be combined
with the sex-based cause of action arising from Title VII).
136. See, e.g., Turk, supra note 108, at 424.
137. Id.
138. See Gates, supra note 102; Dang & Frazer, supra note 102; Cianciotto, supra note 102.
139. “[O]lder women can bring a claim based on their sex or based on their age, but they cannot
bring a claim on the basis of their sex and age combined.” Day, supra note 18, at 449.
140. Statistical “analysis only works if the claimant has someone to compare herself to.” Kramer,
supra note 31, at 933.
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a motion for summary judgment, the employee may need to demonstrate that a
similarly situated white gay male employee was treated more favorably than he
was.141 According to intersectionality theory, however, the idea that a Latino gay
male and white gay male employee are or can be ‘similarly situated’ is untenable,
because the experiences of a Latino homosexual could vary tremendously from
those of the white homosexual. Thus, one way of more broadly encouraging
judicial adoption of intersectionality theory is to change the evidentiary burden
such that employees no longer need to show ‘similarly situated’ comparators to
make a claim for discrimination.
C. Intra-LGBT Intersectional Invisibility
Intra-LGBT intersectionality is a real phenomenon, yet a relatively
unexplored issue in the academic literature.142 As mentioned, there is a highprevalence of intra-LGBT intersectionality.143 Transgender individuals frequently
“[define] themselves as heterosexuals who are attracted to those of the same
biological sex…Thus, after sex reassignment surgery (SRS), the majority of maleto-female (MTF) transsexuals pursue male partners, and the majority of female-tomale (FTM) transsexuals pursue female partners.” 144
Intersectional invisibility works as even more of a sword in the intra-LGBT
context than it does for other LGBT intersectional plaintiffs because these plaintiffs
lack protections from employment discrimination at the federal level and in many
states. If a bisexual transgender plaintiff filed an intersectional discrimination
claim on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, a
court would have numerous options for dismissing the claim. A very conservative
court might deny all legitimacy to this allegation of discrimination, arguing that
neither transgender people nor bisexuals are covered under current law,
summarily dismissing the claim. Even if a court accepted the argument that a
transgender individual is protected by Title VII’s sex discrimination provision, the
court could still find that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which
is currently legal at the federal level, was a permissible basis for taking an adverse
employment action. Similarly, a court could dismiss a transgender homosexual
plaintiff’s claim by rejecting an attempt to ‘bootstrap’ a sexual orientation claim to
a gender discrimination claim. Both scenarios for the transgender bisexual plaintiff
presume a court is even willing to construe Title VII to cover transgender plaintiffs.
The argument that transgender individuals are protected under Title VII remains
an unsettled and somewhat tenuous proposition, which may tip the scales in favor
of dismissing a transgender bisexual plaintiff’s claim.
A further challenge emerges in the intra-LGBT context because courts, and
the public more generally, do not always appropriately differentiate between the

141. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
142. Among the few discussions of intra-LGBT intersectionality in the employment context in the
academic literature is a discussion of sexual harassment in employment discussing lesbian transgender
women. See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Protecting the Margins: Intersectional Strategies to Protecting Gender
Outlaws from Workplace Harassment, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 361 (2013).
143. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 102; Dang and Frazer, supra note 102; Cianciotto, supra note 102.
144. Malloy, supra note 89, at 286 (internal citations omitted).
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subgroups of the LGBT community.145 Courts often conflate gender identity and
sexual orientation, or collapse these distinct traits into one LGBT catch-all.146 When
considering intersectional discrimination in the intra-LGBT context, it is important
for courts to properly distinguish the distinct subgroups of the LGBT construct. 147
“Separating sexual orientation from gender and sex, however, begs the question
at issue in discrimination contexts. A homosexual person is more likely than a
heterosexual person to be perceived as not fitting in with gender stereotypes. By
the court attempting to separate and eventually confusing the concepts of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation, however, it becomes more difficult for a
homosexual plaintiff to bring an action based on gender discrimination.” 148 In the
immigration context, for example, LGBT identity traits are often conflated, with
problematic results:
[C]ourts in LGBT asylum cases have reduced the sociological complexities of
LGBT realities in their decisions. The courts, as institutions, operate on numerous
assumptions regarding biological sex, gender, sexuality, and identity that they
then deploy to configure a social order that privileges heteronormativity and
marginalizes queer realities. In the asylum process, this means that LGBT refugees
bear the added burden of being othered in terms of their sexuality within such a
heteronormative structure.149

Assuming that ENDA or a functionally equivalent statute is enacted, such
legislation would only partially resolve the issue of intra-LGBT intersectional
invisibility. While a bisexual transgender plaintiff’s employer could no longer use
sexual orientation to avoid a sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination
charge, as both would be protected categories, employment discrimination
jurisprudence would still only recognize a single-axis approach to discrimination.
The single-axis analytic approach imposes a continued constraint to redress for
marginalized subclasses. Courts confronting a claim by a bisexual transgender
plaintiff may very well be confounded regarding how to treat the claim. Thus,
until courts or Congress are willing to explicitly recognize a wider range of
subclasses of protected groups, as discussed in section V, infra, intersectional

145. Aaron Ponce, Shoring Up Judicial Awareness: LGBT Refugees and the Recognition of Social
Categories, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L 7 COMP. L. 185, 204 (“In addition, U.S. courts have failed to address the
complexities involved in the intersection of gender and sexuality, and instead have relied on
expectations and stereotypes of gender identity. In Mockeviciene v. U.S., a lesbian claiming persecution
based on her sexuality was met with doubt and dismissal when the judge found that she had a child
and was married. In a rather candid opinion, the immigration judge relegated Moskeviciene’s status
as an LGBT individual to mere whim and uncertainty. This hesitation to believe someone who
challenges both sexuality and gender norms essentially perpetuates the same sociologically
uninformed attitudes that were initially responsible for the persecution.”).
146. “Courts have acknowledged the interrelation between sex, gender and sexual orientation, and
the near impossibility of their divisibility.” Clancy, supra note 94, at 130.
147. To properly characterize intersectional claims, the court must recognize the meaningful
differences between the distinct concepts of sex, gender, gender identity and sexual orientation. See,
e.g., Case, supra note 123. “To a large degree, the Court has conflated the concepts of sex and gender by
using the terms interchangeably, signaling inaccurately that every person’s sex is also that person’s
gender.” Marino, supra note 112, at 869–70.
148. Clancy, supra note 94, at 131 (internal citations omitted); see also Castle, supra note 132, at 1953.
149. Ponce, supra note 145, at 188.

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

THE NEW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

131

invisibility will leave many employees vulnerable, and without the protections
that remedial statutes like Title VII and ENDA are intended to provide. More
generally, for a remedial statute protecting LGBT people to effectively address
both single-axis claims of LGBT discrimination and intersectional LGBT
discrimination, courts and the public need to better understand the distinctions
between sex, gender identity and sexual orientation.
IV. HIGH RISK, LOW REWARD: SCANT OPTIONS FOR INTERSECTIONAL PLAINTIFFS
Under current law and mainstream employment discrimination
jurisprudence, there are several avenues intersectional plaintiffs can pursue to
raise a discrimination claim. While each approach can provide a partial remedy
for an intersectional plaintiff, each has distinct drawbacks. The incomplete
remedies for intersectional plaintiffs discussed in this section underscore the need
for expanding employment discrimination law, and antidiscrimination paradigms
more generally, to account for intersectional discrimination. Options for doing so
are discussed in section V, infra. This section will first present the option of filing
a per se intersectional claim, which is a risky option given the mixed reception
courts have given intersectional claims. The second option is filing separate claims
based on each protected category, which raises other concerns. The third option is
raising a sex-plus claim to loosely approximate an intersectional claim. This
option, however, is available only when sex or gender is the intersectional
category, and only if sex or gender is the primary trait on which discrimination
was based. The fourth and final option is to forego multiple claims and only
pursue a discrimination claim based on one trait or another, in conformity with
the strictures of the single-axis framework.
A. Per Se Intersectional Claim
The first option for plaintiffs who experience intersectional discrimination is
to file a per se intersectional discrimination claim. After all, some plaintiffs have
successfully argued intersectional discrimination, and existing employment
discrimination statutes can be interpreted to permit plaintiffs to bring an
intersectional claim.150 Further, the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII affirms the
viability of intersectional claims, as noted above. However, the viability of a per se
intersectional claim is dependent on the jurisdiction in which the claim is brought,
as well as the particular intersectional subclass raising the claim. Thus, a black
woman in a jurisdiction recognizing intersectionality has the opportunity to bring
a winnable intersectional claim.151 However, a different minority subclass, or a
minority subclass in a different jurisdiction, may lack this option. Insofar as
uniformity for plaintiffs is a goal of employment discrimination law, this type of
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction inconsistency is problematic.
To file a claim of intersectional discrimination, a plaintiff would follow the
same procedure as a single-axis discrimination lawsuit, beginning with the

150. See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo 1976);
Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travanol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d
798 (5th Cir. 1982).
151. Id.
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McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, discussed in section II.B supra.
Courts, however, generally expect these claims to be framed as single-axis claims
in conformity with the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.152 Courts that have
recognized intersectionality have done so for particular intersectional plaintiffs or
certain intersectional groups without articulating a blanketed cause of action for
intersectional discrimination.
There are significant statistical differences in success rates between singleaxis claims and intersectional claims.153 One study demonstrated that “[p]laintiffs
who suffer multiple disadvantages in society fare worse than do singly
disadvantaged plaintiffs when they seek to assert their civil rights in court.” 154
Another study reports that single-axis claims were successful in 7 of 28, or 25% of
cases, while claims brought by black women were only successful in 2 out of 12,
or 17% of cases, however, this was not a statistically significant sample. 155
Further, even if filed as an intersectional claim, a court may separate the
claims, or otherwise contort a complaint of intersectional discrimination to fit the
single-axis framework.156 This is a court-by-court difference, however.157 It is also
significant that per se intersectional claims are not a viable option for LGBT
plaintiffs in the majority of states currently. As discussed in section III, supra,
intersectionality can be used as a sword for employers to avoid other
discrimination claims, such as race, which would only be partially remedied if
ENDA were enacted.
Thus, the feasibility of raising a per se intersectional discrimination claim is
largely dependent on both the jurisdiction in which the claim is brought and the
intersectional identity at issue. In certain jurisdictions, such as the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, some groups, namely black and Asian women, may successfully raise
intersectional claims.158 However, the low success rates for intersectional claims in
general and the small number of jurisdictions that recognize intersectional
discrimination illustrate the need to formally reform employment discrimination
jurisprudence to uniformly protect subclasses of marginalized groups.
B. Separate Single-Axis Claims
A second option for intersectional plaintiffs is to file separate claims for each
of the protected categories that serve as the basis for the intersectional claim. For
example, a black woman would deconstruct an intersectional claim, and file

152. Areheart, supra note 60, at 206.
153. See, e.g., Best et al., supra note 15.
154. Id. at 1019.
155. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment
Discrimination Law and Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 511, 544 (2003).
156. See, e.g., Chaddah v. Harris Bank Glencoe-Northbrook, N.A., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693, at
*17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1994) (separating multiple discrimination claims, ultimately dismissing each); See
also Clay v. BPS Guard Servs., Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1993).
157. “Some courts aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility, while
others deal with an adverse employment action based on two or more grounds separately.” Hoffman
& Varona, supra note 40, at 553–54.
158. See supra section III.
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separate race and gender discrimination claims. While this approach may not
appear problematic, filing separate claims has disadvantages, and is conceptually
distinct from raising a per se intersectional claim.
In the first instance, alleging that discrimination occurred because of two
separate traits is not the same as saying that the discrimination resulted from the
combination thereof. The two distinct identity traits may in fact be inextricably
linked. Discrimination on the basis of one trait may be indistinguishable from
discrimination on the combination of the two. Legally, this approach limits the
direct relevance of the claim to the discrimination experience. Personally, this
approach further marginalizes the experience of subclasses of minorities.
Second, discrimination claims in general tend to be unsuccessful in court. 159
Studies have demonstrated that skepticism can be magnified when multiple
claims of discrimination are alleged simultaneously. 160 Filing multiple separate
counts of discrimination could suggest that an aggrieved employee is filing a
discrimination claim as a last-ditch effort to save a job or earn some money,
necessarily undermining the legitimacy of a discrimination claim. Taking a
“kitchen sink” approach to discrimination claims is thus an ill-conceived tactic for
effectively remediating intersectional discrimination, because the claim of
multiple counts of discrimination may cancel each other out, and strip a plaintiff
of any redress.
C. Sex-Plus Claim
To loosely approximate an intersectional claim that involves sex or gender
discrimination, a plaintiff could bring a sex-plus case. “‘Sex-plus’ doctrine, which
originated in the early 1970s, enables plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have been
discriminated against on the basis of sex by showing that they have been treated
differently than members of the opposite sex with whom they share a particular,
ostensibly non-sex-related characteristic.”161 Sex-plus theory can help some
intersectional plaintiffs; however, sex-discrimination claim must be the crux of the
claim. “A ‘sex-plus’ protection for black men was adopted in Johnson v. Memphis
Police Department, which found that a policy against facial hair discriminated
against many black men who, unlike white men, suffer from a skin condition that
makes it unhealthy to shave every day.”162
Like the option of filing separate claims discussed above in the previous
section, a sex-plus claim is not the same as a per se intersectional claim because the
weight of the discrimination is placed on the gender discrimination claim. This

159. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 155, at 516 (finding that while discrimination claims were
generally unsuccessful relative to other types of claims, “success rates varied considerably by case
category, with the lowest success rates in employment discrimination cases (excepting sexual
harassment cases) filed by women and minorities. Success rates were lowest at the intersection of race
and gender and the intersection of gender and age (over forty)”).
160. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1439, 1443 (2009) (“Empirical evidence demonstrates that multiple claims [of discrimination] are
all but impossible to win.”).
161. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307,
1374 (2012).
162. Hoffman & Varona, supra note 40, at 554.
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type of claim does not lend itself to consideration of the unique experiences of
intersectional plaintiffs, and is limited to certain intersectional subclasses.163 While
some have called for the creation of an analogous race-plus theory,164 this has not
come to fruition, and, for the same reasons as sex-plus theory, would fall short of
providing effective redress for intersectional discrimination per se. Like filing per
se intersectional claims, the viability of sex-plus claims is jurisdiction dependent.
Sex-plus categories are relatively narrow, and the ones that have been
recognized by the courts include women with school-age children, “minority
women, married women, and married women who keep their surnames.” 165 “In
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the employer would hire women, but not women
with pre-school-age children. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary
judgment to the employer because the policy resulted in ‘one hiring policy for
women and another for men--each having pre-school-age children.’”166 While sexplus doctrine may provide some intersectional plaintiffs with a cause of action in
a limited number of jurisdictions, this approach falls far short of remedying
intersectional discrimination for all minority subclasses.
D. Single-Axis Claim
The last option for an intersectional plaintiff seeking to bring an employment
discrimination claim would be to bring one single-axis claim, foregoing the second
basis on which discrimination would otherwise be alleged. This is a strategic
option for a plaintiff living in a jurisdiction that has already rejected intersectional
claims, yet also raises a number of obvious problems. Most fundamentally, a claim
based on one trait alone would fail to capture the full experience an employee has
had with discrimination. Bringing only one claim simplistically collapses the
unique experience of a distinct majority into a more palatable, judicially
cognizable form of discrimination. It also may be impossible to disaggregate
discrimination on the basis of one characteristic from discrimination based on
another trait.
In the LGBT context, this tactic may not work. Even if an intersectional LGBT
plaintiff, such as a Latino homosexual, frames a claim purely as a race
discrimination claim, an employer can rebut a claim of discrimination by alleging
that the discrimination was based primarily on sexual orientation-related grounds,
provided sexual orientation is not a protected trait in that state.167 Thus, an
employer can effectively raise sexual orientation as an affirmative defense to an
allegation of discrimination based on a protected trait. Merely bringing one claim
while foregoing another claim, then, may not be an effective approach for
intersectional LGBT plaintiffs.

163. In addition to race/sex intersectional plaintiffs, such as black women and Asian women,
scholars have written about older women as a subclass in need of intersectional recognition. See e.g.,
Day, supra note 18.
164. Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in the Workplace: The Case for “Race Plus,” 45 HARV.
CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 57 (2010).
165. Hoffman & Varona, supra note 40, at 552–53.
166. Id.
167. See e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 302–03.
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V. NEW APPROACHES FOR PROTECTING INTERSECTIONAL LGBT
PLAINTIFFS
Given the manifest deficiencies of Title VII, the underinclusiveness of ENDA,
and the problems with fragmented recognition of intersectionality in employment
discrimination law, it is necessary to reform employment discrimination law to
recognize the prevalent albeit subtle forms of discrimination at issue today. While
such sweeping changes will be difficult to effectuate, such changes are necessary
for employment discrimination statutes to effectively provide judicial redress for
immutable trait-based discrimination.168 Although public opinion has solidified in
favor of extending protection to LGBT employees in the workplace,169 stakeholders
have not coalesced around one piece of legislation to the point of its passage. 170
Thus, it is still possible, and normatively desirable, that an intersectional cause of
action could be included for all intersectional plaintiffs as part-and-parcel of
extending employment discrimination protections to cover all LGBT plaintiffs.
There are a number of possible approaches that could address intersectional
invisibility in employment discrimination law. There is another set of likely
possible outcomes, however, which do not closely track the ideal approaches for
formally addressing intersectionality in employment discrimination law. These
approaches, and the likelihood of success, will be discussed more fully below, first
delving into judicial solutions to intersectionality, which are more likely, followed
by a discussion of legislative reforms, which are more desirable.
A. Judicial
Because LGBT issues are highly contentious, and issues involving
discrimination and civil rights more broadly tend to be divisive in the political
branches of government, a judicially based solution to intersectional invisibility is
most likely to materialize.171 Some courts have taken the first step towards
recognizing intersectionality.172 The courts that have done so, however, have
168. “Sweeping changes to make the federal template of legal remedies address the lived realities
of discrimination are unlikely in the shorter term of the next several decades. Given the incoherence of
federal statutory protection for employment discrimination, scholars have argued for comprehensive
changes to the architecture of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In
1996, Professor Ann McGinley made a thoughtful argument that, other than with respect to harassment
and retaliation law, Congress should replace Title VII, the ADEA, and variable state employment-atwill exceptions with a federal wrongful discharge law that protects all workers from arbitrary
discharge.” Levit, supra note 16, at 481.
169. Gates & Newport, supra note 85.
170. For example, some LGBT rights organizations have advocated for abandoning ENDA, but not
because of ENDA’s lack of intersectional awareness. Instead, these groups have critiqued ENDA for
the broad exemptions contemplated therein for religiously-based discrimination against LGBT
employees. See, e.g., L.A. Times Editorial Board, Obama Should Say No to Religion-based Exemption on
Hiring Discrimination, L.A.TIMES, July 8, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-edreligious-exemption-federal-contracts-20140709-story.html.
171. Courts have been important institutions for extending protections to LGBT Americans. The
rights established through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor,
and Obergefell v. Hodges are arguably the most significant legal protections LGBT individuals have
received at the federal level.
172. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
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stopped short of articulating a broad understanding of actionable claims of
intersectional discrimination under Title VII, providing only a limited
intersectional cause of action for certain minority subclasses.
Courts have manifested rigid interpretations of discrimination statute, and
seldom recognize claims of discrimination, despite the legitimacy thereof. The low
success rate for employment discrimination claims in general is a discouraging
harbinger for judicially catalyzed developments in intersectional discrimination.
“[O]nly 15% of employment discrimination cases between 1999 to 2007 ended in a
win for the employee.”173 While some courts will inevitably reject such
discrimination claims, courts are less constrained by the political dimension of
discrimination issues.
The first option for judicially-based reform to remedy intersectional
invisibility is for courts to articulate a broad understanding of intersectional
discrimination, explicitly allowing any intersectional group to bring an
intersectional claim. For this analytic approach to take hold, however, the Supreme
Court will have to make this ruling, instructing all courts to embrace a conception
of discrimination that is broader than the single-axis approach. Alternatively,
courts could begin widely, formally adopting the EEOC interpretation of Title VII
as including intersectionality. It is apparent that LGBT individuals will not be able
to ‘mix’ claims with Title VII claims if they are protected under ENDA or a nonTitle VII statute, thus this approach may only remediate intersectional
discrimination for certain intersectional plaintiffs. This would exclude LGBT
plaintiffs, the disabled, the elderly, and pregnant women, among others.
A second option that the judiciary could use to incorporate intersectional
discrimination into mainstream employment discrimination jurisprudence is to
amend the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to explicitly allow for
intersectional claims. The first step to doing this would be to amend the prima
facie case of discrimination. Rather than requiring that a plaintiff be a member of
a single protected class, courts could allow plaintiffs to frame a claim as a member
of multiple protected classes.
A third way that courts can include intersectional analysis in employment
discrimination jurisprudence would be to limit the use of statistics and comparator
groups in an employment discrimination inquiry. 174 Courts must lessen reliance
on comparators to establish discrimination claims. As noted, if a plaintiff is unable
to produce similarly-situated comparators, it can be difficult to prove a claim of
discrimination. As one scholar notes:
[S]howing that a similarly situated individual was treated differently than the
plaintiff is the most common way of establishing discrimination. However, when a
comparator cannot be found, or when discrimination is based on two separate
impermissible factors, the employee’s burden of proving discrimination becomes much
more onerous, or even impossible.175

Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467 (1992).
173. Castle, supra note 132, at 1960.
174. For a robust discussion of possible reforms to the use of statistics and comparators in the
employment discrimination context, see Goldberg, supra note 66.
175. Day, supra note 18, at 453 (emphasis added).
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The Jeffries Court, which held that black women should be a recognized
subclass, presciently foreshadowed the recommendation advanced in this paper,
by arguing that relying on similarly-situated comparators is misplaced. The Jeffries
court recognized “the fact that black males and white females are not subject to
discrimination is irrelevant and must not form any part of the basis for a finding that
the employer did not discriminate against the black female plaintiff.”176 Rather than using
similarly situated comparators to prove discrimination, courts should rely
exclusively on other direct and circumstantial evidence. Thus, courts should craft
a rule that limits, contextualizes or prohibits the use of statistical comparators in
proving a discrimination claim. Limiting the use of statistics would necessarily
require a more individualized, nuanced assessment of an allegation of
discrimination to determine whether discrimination in fact occurred, and whether
the discrimination is actionable.
B. Congressional
The first option for a legislative remedy for LGBT employment
discrimination is to pass a supplemental statute, such as ENDA, 177 which would
protect individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, but
which may also lack some of Title VII’s structural and substantive protections.
While ENDA has gained traction in Congress in recent years, and could
foreseeably pass in the near future, ENDA in its current form lacks some of the
protections, such as disparate impact analysis, that are embedded in Title VII. This
bill also lacks an intersectional component, which inherently limits the efficacy of
gay and lesbian discrimination legislation, because the unique experiences of
multiply subordinated individuals will be subsumed by the experiences of the
privileged gays and lesbians.178 Adopting this approach would effectively punt the
issue of intersectionality back to the courts, where little resolution has occurred to
this point. While pursuing this statute may be a good step towards enshrining
formal employment discrimination protection for LGBT people in law at the
federal level, the deficiencies of this legislation and the political capital that will be
spent passing it merit critical examination of what exactly this legislation will do,
since it would be only the second federal gay rights bill passed by Congress. 179
The second option for congressional reform of employment discrimination
law would be to pass an amendment to Title VII, incorporating sexual orientation
and gender identity, and expressly permitting intersectional claims. Although this

176. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (emphasis added).
177. “The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011 (ENDA) proposes to essentially extend
Title VII protections to Americans who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, making it illegal for employers to
hire, fire, refuse to promote, or treat in a hostile manner persons based on their sexual orientation.
Various versions of ENDA have been introduced in both houses of Congress since 1994, but what all
the versions have had in common is the inclusion of an exemption for religious organizations. In its
current form, ENDA does not apply to a ‘corporation, association, educational institution, or society
that is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII.’” Robinson, supra note 22, at
170 (internal citations omitted).
178. Onwuachi-Willig & Nourafshan, supra note 84.
179. The first federal gay rights bill was the Matthew Sheppard Hate Crime Act of 2009. 18 U.S.C.
§ 249 (2009).

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

138 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

Volume 24:107 2017

would be difficult to push through Congress, as evinced by the decades long effort
to no avail, this would be the most desirable option in that Plaintiffs would retain
all the rights afforded under Title VII. For a litany of additional reasons, other
scholars have also made similar recommendations for including LGBT as a
protected class through an amendment to Title VII, as opposed to a stand-alone
statute, such as ENDA.180 As noted above, a compromise necessary for garnering
support for ENDA was abandoning a disparate impact cause of action. 181
However, the problem would still persist regarding intersectionality. Title VII
should further be amended under this approach to a conjunctive rather than
disjunctive. In other words, by changing Title VII to an ‘and’ instead of an ‘or,’
plaintiffs would have a stronger textual basis for arguing that the legislative intent
was to allow for intersectional claims.
A third option would be to separately address LGBT discrimination and
intersectionality. This approach would require one piece of legislation to prohibit
discrimination against LGBT people in the employment context, and a second
legislative effort to explicitly allow plaintiffs to bring intersectional claims, both
under Title VII, and under other remedial statutes, such as the ADEA or ENDA.
This approach would have the effect of mandating recognition of intersectional
plaintiffs, while broadening the coverage of antidiscrimination jurisprudence to
include LGBT people, both intersectional and non-intersectional alike. While this
would achieve the desired outcome of protecting LGBT and intersectional
plaintiffs, there is little evidence to suggest that Congress would pass even one, let
alone two, employment discrimination statutes in the near-term.
C. Social Movement Strategies
In addition to legislative and judicial solutions to intersectional
discrimination, it is necessary to incorporate intersectional issues as a priority
within the LGBT rights movement. Considerations of intersectionality have been
conspicuously absent from the mainstream LGBT rights movement thus far, 182
presenting an opportunity to advocate for reform on this issue. 183 Given the
immediate impact of intersectionality on many LGBT plaintiffs, it seems natural
that the LGBT rights movement would embrace intersectional discrimination as
an important issue both in rhetoric and in seeking tangible legislative reforms.
180. This article is not the first to recommend amending Title VII. “The proposed solution for
revising Title VII is strikingly simple: Amend Title VII to include gender and sexual orientation. The
amended Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, gender,
sexual orientation or national origin. The first half of the proposal would merely reflect the law as it is
interpreted today by the courts—on one hand explicitly (gender) and on the other hand implicitly
(sexual orientation). The result would reinforce the existing protections on gender and remove the
confusion regarding sexual orientation. No longer will courts be forced to artificially sever a ‘legitimate’
gender-based claim from an ‘illegitimate’ sexual orientation claim. This would also remove the
significant barrier of the double punishment homosexuals face by the current construction of Title VII.
Finally, the statutory language would reflect the realities of sexuality: that gender and sexual
orientation are inseparably linked, and not subject to categorical classifications—something Kinsey
famously stated almost 70 years ago.” Clancy, supra note 94, at 134 (internal citations omitted).
181. Hendricks, supra note 13.
182. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig & Nourafshan, supra note 84.
183. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 1368.
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D. The Limits of Intersectionality
While intersectionality theory recognizes a major gap in employment
discrimination law, there are limits to intersectionality as well.184 Although
intersectional discrimination broadens the groups that can claim meaningful
protection under antidiscrimination statutes, there are limits to this approach
when considering the pervasiveness of individualized discrimination. Remedying
intersectional discrimination does not, for example, capture identity performance
claims or other forms of intragroup discrimination. Identity performance
discrimination consists of informal requirements that individuals from minority
groups assimilate into white, heteronormative 185 culture by downplaying traits
associated with the minority group:186
For example, many professional black men make a special effort to wear suits or
traditional, professional clothing when they are in public settings in order to
minimize the discrimination that they may experience just based on appearance-their skin color, height, and other physical characteristics. After all, the black man
in the Brooks Brothers suit is less likely to be followed in a department store than
the black man in jeans or sweats, though both are highly likely to be viewed as
suspicious despite their dress.187

Among other examples, “[b]lacks have masked their accent on phones,
speaking in what they and others perceive to be white, standard English and with
a “white” accent, even if that is not their usual tone, to avoid discrimination.” 188
In addition to overlooking discrimination based on identity performance,
intersectional discrimination also does not address the issue of intragroup
discrimination more broadly. “[T]he typical cross-racial framework does not fit
skin color and identity performance claims because, in many of these cases, the
decision maker and the plaintiff are members of the same group.” 189
While the recognition of intersectionality does not automatically remedy all
forms of discrimination not captured under the currently employment
discrimination regime, employment discrimination jurisprudence and
antidiscrimination law is premised on a categorical approach to discrimination
claims. That issue is fundamentally different from the problem addressed in this
article.
184. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., After Intersectionality, 71 UMKC L. REV.
485 (2002); Peter Kwan, Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Class, Gener & Sexual Orientation: Jeffrey Dhamer
and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997).
185. “[H]eternormativity is defined as the predominance and privileging of a definitively
heterosexual-based ideology and social structure that acts as the exclusive interpreter of itself and of
all other sexualities in relation to it. Heteronormativity results from social actors’ investment in this
ideology and the social structures that are produced by such a complete reliance on the idea of
heteronormativity. This comment argues that in so initiating a process of institutionalization during
the course of a legal proceeding, courts have the unique opportunity to circumscribe the acceptable
boundaries of both nationality and sexuality within their social domains.” Ponce, supra note 145, at 188
(internal citations omitted).
186. See e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willing, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 (2007).
187. Id. at 1910.
188. Id. at 1912.
189. Jones, supra note 3 (internal citations omitted).

Macro1 (Do Not Delete)

5/15/2017 10:21 AM

140 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 24:107 2017

Some argue that “[t]he issue is not reducing individuals to simple labels; it is
that new labels are needed to fit new situations.” 190 While a growing group of
scholars have called for a more individualized approach to adjudicating
discrimination claims to capture otherwise unaccounted for types of
individualized discrimination like identity performance and intragroup
preferences, it is unrealistic to expect the law to abandon a categorical approach
entirely. As one scholar points out:
The population in this country is rising, aging, and becoming much more racially
and ethnically diverse. Appearance norms are shifting too. More than one-third of
Americans aged 18 to 29 sport at least one tattoo. Fourteen percent of all Americans
have body piercings other than in their earlobes. America is also becoming
increasingly economically stratified, with ever greater differences between the
haves and the have-nots. This is just a sketch of the numerous ways that the
composition and identity characteristics of the American workforce are changing.
These changes have enormous implications for constitutional and employment
discrimination law.191

Employment discrimination law must evolve its current categorical approach
to analyzing discrimination to remedy existing intersectional invisibility and
anticipate changes that are imminent in the American workforce in the years to
come.
VI. CONCLUSION
Americans have succumbed to the seductive fallacy that the codification of
antidiscrimination laws has led to substantive equality for marginalized groups.
As the issue of intersectional invisibility illustrates, however, there are gaps in
current antidiscrimination law, which ENDA threatens to carry forward. If the
collective response to the passage of ENDA parallels the response to Title VII,
there is a real risk that the LGBT rights advocates will prematurely declare victory,
reflecting an incomplete understanding of how employment discrimination law
fails to provide meaningful recourse for subgroups of otherwise protected classes,
given the persistence of intersectional invisibility.192 Subtle discrimination has
become a prevalent form of workplace discrimination and social
marginalization,193 requiring an evolving antidiscrimination paradigm to keep

190.
Malloy, supra note 89, at 315.
191. Levit, supra note 16, at 464–65 (internal citations omitted).
192. In a review of Linda Hirshman’s Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution, entitled Declaration
Premature, Diane Hamer bemoans the perils of declaring a movement victory before equality has been
achieved. Diane Hamer, Declaration Premature, THE GAY & LESBIAN REVIEW, Jan. 1, 2013 at 41. Some
scholars take an even more pessimistic view about the progress that has been achieved in the LGBT
rights movement thus far. In Be the People, Professor Carol Swain argues that the paradigm of political
correctness may make the gay rights movement seem more successful by suppressing dissenting voices
through fear of being labeled as narrow-minded or bigoted. See CAROL SWAIN, BE THE PEOPLE: A CALL
TO RECLAIM AMERICA’S FAITH AND PROMISE (2011).
193. “Discrimination relating to more subtle countercultural deviations along various dimensions
of identity remains unprotected. Consider, for example, employers’ regulation of employees’
appearances.” Levit, supra note 16, at 478.
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pace with societal and institutional evolution.194 Current law fails to do so.195
Indeed, ENDA may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem. While
some courts have allowed intersectional claims by protected classes under Title
VII, there is no indication that even these courts would allow plaintiffs to state an
intersectional claim arising from two different statutes. Further, because ENDA
does not recognize disparate impact claims, LGBT plaintiffs would lack an
important cause of action for combatting facially neutral policies with
disproportionate LGBT impact. This supports inclusion of sexual orientation and
gender identity as amendments to Title VII as opposed to a stand-alone statute,
like ENDA.
Failure to recognize intersectional claims not only deprives intersectional
plaintiffs of a legal remedy, but also serves a communicative or symbolic function:
The single-axis framework defines normalcy in the law. If employment
discrimination law recognizes only a single trait in a sex discrimination claim, for
example, the implication is either that the plaintiff is white or that white and nonwhite female plaintiffs experience discrimination similarly in terms of nature and
degree. Either scenario reflects a conception of discrimination that elides the
meaningful differences in discrimination experienced by distinct minority
subclasses. Conceptions of actionable discrimination should therefore be
broadened to reflect the multiple axes along which individuals experience
marginalization, which is necessary to facilitate access to justice for large
proportions of the increasingly intersectional American workforce.

194. “The transformation of the workplace in the next couple of decades—with people aging, races
mixing, class-based divides increasing, and individual appearances becoming more distinct—will
occur in directions that make people less different in group-based ways, but perhaps more uniquely
different as individuals. These changes mean that the remedies afforded by any system of class-based
protections will fail to redress systematically the real discrimination happening in workplaces.” Id. at
469.
195. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 31, at 894 (“Sex discrimination law has not kept pace with the
lived experience of discrimination. When Title VII became law, most instances of sex discrimination
involved overt discrimination that differentiated between men and women, almost always to the
detriment of female employees.”).

